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Abstract
In this paper, we consider extended Nash equilibriums of nonmonetized
noncooperative games. By using a modiﬁed ﬁxed point theorem of set-valued
mappings on partially ordered sets, we prove an existence theorem of extended Nash
equilibriums of the nonmonetized noncooperative game. Finally, an example is given
to illustrate the advantages of our results.
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1 Introduction
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem is an extension of the standard Nash equilib-
rium problem, in which the strategy set of each player depends on the strategies of all the
other players as well as on his own. This problem has recently attracted much attention
due to its applications in various ﬁelds like mathematics, management, economics and
engineering. For details, we refer the reader to a recent survey paper by Facchinei and
Kanzow [] and the references therein. Very recently, a special class of generalized Nash
equilibriums in which the noncooperative games possess strategies as subsets of vector
spaces and the ranges of the payoﬀ functions as partially ordered sets (posets) was exam-
ined by many researchers, for example, Carl et al. [], Li et al. [–] and Xie et al. [, ].
Such games are said to be nonmonetized noncooperative (NNGs for short).
The existence of generalized Nash equilibriums has become the focus of research in
NNGs. For instance, in [, ] the authors proved the existence via diﬀerent ﬁxed point the-
orems on Banach lattices. Since a Banach lattice is equipped with some metric topology
and algebraic structures, the proofs of the existence follow the same idea as the traditional
games, applying ﬁxed point theorems in topological vector spaces. To avoid this, very re-
cently, in [] the authors obtained the existence results on lattices, which are equippedwith
neither a topological structure nor an algebraic structure, but only with a special partial
order, i.e., a lattice order. Moreover, in [] the authors extended the concept of general-
ized Nash equilibrium to extended Nash equilibrium and proved an existence theorem of
extended Nash equilibriums of the NNG by applying a ﬁxed point theorem on posets.
Motivated by the works mentioned above, in this paper we also consider extended Nash
equilibriums of the NNG and establish an existence result due to an improved ﬁxed point
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theorem corresponding to [] for set-valued mappings on posets without the considera-
tion of a topological structure nor an algebraic structure. We relax the assumptions of the
order compactness and the chain-completeness and hence our result compares favorably
with that of []. Finally, we will give an example to show the advantages of our results.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall brieﬂy somedeﬁnitions and properties of posets. Formore details,
we refer to [–] and [–].
Let P = (P ,) be a poset with the partial order . An element u ∈P is called an upper
bound of a subset A of P if x  u for each x ∈ A. If u ∈ A, we say that u is the greatest
element of A and denote u = maxA. The supremum of A, denoted by supA, is an element
u which is an upper bound of A and u  v as long as v is another upper bound of A. It is
clear that maxA = supA if they exist. The maximal element of A is an element y ∈ Awhich
satisﬁes y = z whenever z ∈ A and y  z. Obviously, if u ∈ A is an upper bound of A, then
u is a maximal element of A. The lower bound, the smallest element (minA), the inﬁmum
(infA), and the minimal element of A can be similarly deﬁned.
A subset A is called a chain if any two elements of A are comparable, i.e., x y or y x
for all x, y ∈ A. A is said to be a countable chain if A is a chain and is countable. By c.c. we
denote a countable chain. For any z,w ∈P , we deﬁne the order intervals as follows:
[z) = {x ∈P : z  x}, (w] = {x ∈P : x w} and
[z,w] = [z)∩ (w] = {x ∈P : z  x w}.
For given posets (X,X) and (U ,U ), a single-valued mapping F from (X,X) into
(U ,U ) is said to be order increasing if F(x)U F(y) whenever xX y.
In the following deﬁnition, we require some weaker conditions compared with Deﬁni-
tions . and . of [].
Deﬁnition . A poset (P ,) is said to be
(i) inductive if every c.c. C ⊂P has an upper bound in P and strongly inductive if
supC exists in P for every c.c. C ⊂P ;
(ii) inversely inductive if every c.c. in P has a lower bound in P and strongly inversely
inductive whenever every c.c. C ⊂P has the inﬁmum in P ;
(iii) bi-inductive whenever it is both inductive and inversely inductive and strongly
bi-inductive whenever it is both strongly inductive and strongly inversely inductive.
Lemma . If P is a bi-inductive poset, then every subset A ⊂ P is also a bi-inductive
poset.
The following ﬁxed point theorem on posets, which improves the corresponding result
of [], will play an essential role in our main results.
Theorem . Let (X,) be a poset. For a given nonempty subset P of X and a set-valued
function F : X → X , we assume that
(H) there exist u, v ∈P with u  v such that F[X] =⋃x∈X F(x)⊂ [u, v];
(H) if p ∈P , then minF(p) and maxF(p) exist and belong to P .Moreover, minF(p) is a
lower bound of F[X ∩ [p]] and maxF(p) is an upper bound of F[X ∩ (p]];
Zhao et al. Fixed Point Theory and Applications  (2015) 2015:65 Page 3 of 9
(H) the set {maxF(p) : p ∈P} is a strongly inversely inductive subset of X and the set
{minF(p) : p ∈P} is a strongly inductive subset of X .
Then F has the greatest ﬁxed point u∗ and the smallest ﬁxed point u∗ in P , that is, u∗ =
maxF (X) and u∗ = minF (X), where F (X) = {x ∈ X : x ∈ F(x)}.
Proof Let G(p) = minF(p) for each p ∈ P . By virtue of (H), G is well deﬁned and an in-
creasing mapping from P into itself. From (H) it follows that every c.c. of G[P] has a
supremum in P . Moreover, u  G(u) with u given in (H). Hence, G[[u)] ⊂ [u) by
the fact that G is increasing.
In what follows, we prove that G has a ﬁxed point in [u). Let ui+ =G(ui) for i = , , . . . .
Then {ui} is a c.c. and hence has a supremum by (H). In addition, xGx for any x ∈ {ui}.
Let u = sup{ui} and P = {ui}∞i= ∪{u}. If u =G(u), thenG has a ﬁxed point. Otherwise,
take ui+ =G(ui ) for i = , , . . . . Again, the set {u,u, . . .} has the supremum u = supui by
(H). Denote P = {u,u, . . .} ∪ {u}. If u = G(u), then G has a ﬁxed point. Otherwise,
repeating this process, eitherG has a ﬁxed point, or we can obtain a set sequenceP,P, . . .
satisfying
(i) Pk = {uk– ,uk– , . . .} ∪ {uk} with uk = sup{uk–i } and uki =G(uki–) for i,k = , , . . . ;
(ii) uki–  uki ,uk–j  ukt and ui = ui for i,k = , , . . . and j, t = , , . . . .
Let Q = ⋃∞k=Pk . Then, like the proof of Lemma . in [], we can verify that Q is a
c.c.,G(Q)⊂Q⊂P and xG(x) for all x ∈Q. (H) shows thatG has the greatest element
u∗ = maxQ. From G(Q) ⊂Q it follows that G(u∗) u∗, while u∗ ∈Q implies u∗  G(u∗).
Consequently, u∗ is a ﬁxed point of G in [u) satisfying
u∗ = maxQ = supG(Q) = min
{
u ∈ [u) :G(u) u
}
,
where the last equation is an immediate consequence of Proposition . in [].
Now we prove that u∗ is a lower bound of F (X). Suppose that this is not true. Then
there exists a point x ∈ F (X) such that u∗  x. Note that x ∈ F(x), we have minQ = u  x
by (H). On the other hand, for any y ∈Q and y x, in view of the condition (H) and the
deﬁnition of G, we see that G(y) is a lower bound of F(x). This implies that G(y) x. Now
the composition ofQ, combining with u ∈Q, guarantees that u∗  x, which contradicts
the choice of x. Consequently, u∗ is a lower bound of F (X).
Finally, we observe that u∗ = G(u∗) = minF(u∗) ∈ F(u∗), which implies that u∗ ∈ F (X)
and hence u∗ = minF (X). Moreover, u∗ = minF(u∗) ∈P by (H).
Similar to the above discussion, we can prove the existence of the greatest ﬁxed point
u∗ of F . This proof is complete. 
3 Main results
Deﬁnition . [] Let n be a positive integer greater than . An n-person NNG consists
of the following elements:
() the set of n players, which is denoted by N = {, , . . . ,n};
() the collection of n strategy sets S = {S,S, . . . ,Sn}, where Si stands for the strategy
set of player i for i ∈N , which is also written as S = S × S × · · · × Sn;
() the set of n payoﬀ functions P = {P,P, . . . ,Pn}, where Pi, a mapping from
S × S × · · · × Sn into the poset (U ,U ), is the payoﬀ function of player i for i ∈N ;
() the outcome space (U ,U ), which is a poset.
This game is denoted by  = {N ,S,P,U}.
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In an n-person NNG  = {N ,S,P,U}, when all the players simultaneously and inde-
pendently choose their own strategies x,x, . . . ,xn to play, where xi ∈ Si for i ∈ N , then
the player i will receive his payoﬀ Pi(x,x, . . . ,xn) ∈ U . For every given i ∈ N and any
x = (x,x, . . . ,xn) ∈ S, we adopt the following notations for convenience:
–i =N\{i}, i = , , , . . . ,n,
x–i = (x,x, . . . ,xi–,xi+, . . . ,xn),
S–i = S × S × · · · × Si– × Si+ × · · · × Sn.
Then x–i ∈ S–i, and we can simply write x as x = (xi,x–i). Moreover, we deﬁne Pi(Si,x–i) =
{Pi(ti,x–i) : ti ∈ Si}.
Deﬁnition . [] In an n-person NNG  = {N ,S,P,U}, a selection of strategies x˜ =
(x˜, x˜, . . . , x˜n) ∈ S × S × · · · × Sn is called an extended Nash equilibrium of this game
if the order relation
Pi(x˜i, x˜–i)⊀U Pi(xi, x˜–i), ∀xi ∈ Si,
holds for every i ∈N .
Lemma . [] Let (Si,i) be a poset for every i ∈ N . Let S = S × S × · · · × Sn be the
Cartesian product space of S,S, . . . ,Sn, and let S be the coordinate partial order on S
induced by the partial order i, that is, for any x, y ∈ S with x = (x,x, . . . ,xn) and y =
(y, y, . . . , yn), we have
xS y if and only if xi i yi, ∀i ∈N and
x≺S y if and only if xi i yi and xi = yi for some i ∈N .
Then (S,S) is a poset. Furthermore, if every (Si,i) is (strongly) inductive, then (S,S)
is also (strongly) inductive. If every (Si,i) is (strongly) bi-inductive, then (S,S) is also
(strongly) bi-inductive.
Let P = {A : A⊂ S is a c.c.}. We introduce a partial order on P as follows: A B if and
only if A⊆ B and A≺ B if and only if A B but A = B for all A,B ∈ P .
Lemma . (P ,) has a maximal element and a minimal element.
Proof On the contrary, suppose that, for each A ∈ P , there exists at least an element
B ∈ P such that A≺ B. Let f (A) = B. Then f is a mapping from P into itself and satisﬁes
A ≺ f (A) for each A ∈ P . We assert that every countable chain of P has a supremum
inP . In fact, if C = {A,A, . . .} is a countable chain ofP , then Ak is a countable subset of
S for k = , , . . . . Let A =
⋃∞
k=Ak . It is easy to see that A belongs to P and is a supremum
of C . In the light of Lemma . in [], f has a ﬁxed point A = f (A) ∈ P . On the other
hand, from the deﬁnition of f we have A ≺ f (A). This is a contradiction. Therefore, P
has a maximal element. Analogously, we can prove the existence of a minimal element.
This proof is complete. 
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In this sequel, themaximal element (resp.minimal element) ofP is said to be amaximal
c.c. (resp. minimal c.c.) of S.
Lemma . If S is inductive (inversely inductive), then S has a maximal element s (min-
imal element s).Moreover, supP∗ exists and equals s (infP∗ exists and equals s) where
P∗(P∗) is a maximal c.c. (minimal c.c.) of S.
Proof Lemma . guarantees the existence of the maximal c.c. P∗ of S and the inductive
hypothesis further guarantees the existence of the upper bound s of P∗. We ﬁrst check
that s is a maximal element of S. To this end, we choose an element x ∈ S with s S x. If
x /∈ P∗, then B = P∗ ∪ {x} is also a c.c., i.e., B ∈ P . Obviously, P∗ ≺ B, which is a contra-
diction sinceP∗ is the maximal element ofP . Consequently, x ∈P∗. Since s is the upper
bound of P∗, we have x S s. Hence x = s and this implies that s is a maximal element
of S. Note that s ∈P∗, we see that s is the supremum of P∗. The proof for the existence
of a minimal element of S is analogous. This proof is complete. 
We are in a position to state and prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem . Let  = {N ,S,P,U} be an n-person NNG. If the following conditions hold:
(I) every player’s strategy set (Si,i) (i ∈N ) is a strongly inductive and inversely
inductive poset,
(II) every player’s payoﬀ function Pi : S →U (i ∈N ) satisﬁes
Pi(x)U Pi(y) if and only if xS y for any x, y ∈ S and i ∈N ,
then the game  has an extended Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,  has minimal and
maximal extended Nash equilibriums.
Proof Lemma . guarantees that S has at least a maximal c.c. P . Let P = {ξ, ξ, . . .},




, . . . ,x
j
n) are comparable with respect to S for
k, j = , , . . . . For any ﬁxed i ∈ N , let Si = {xki }∞k=. Then Si ⊂ Si and Si is obviously a c.c.
of Si for i ∈ N . Hence there exist an upper bound s˜i and a lower bound t˜i of Si since Si is
bi-inductive for i ∈N . We will verify that Si is a maximal c.c. of Si for i ∈N . Suppose that
this is not true. There exists some i ∈N such that Si is not a maximal c.c. of Si , i.e., there
exists another c.c. Ai of Si such that Si ⊂ Ai and hence there exists a with a ∈ Ai and
a /∈ Si . We have three cases:
Case . a≺i xki for all k = , , . . . ;
Case . xki ≺i a for all k = , , . . . ;
Case . there exists a positive integer k such that xki ≺i a≺i xk+i .
In case , let η = (y, y, . . . , yn) with yi = t˜i if i = i and yi = a. Then η /∈P and η ≺S ξk for
k = , , . . . . Thus {η} ∪P is a c.c. of S and P ⊂ {η} ∪P , which contradicts the maximality
of P . Assume that case  occurs. We take yi = s˜i instead of yi = t˜i if i = i and yi = a for
every component yi of η given in case . Thus we have that η /∈ P , ξk ≺S η, P ⊂ {η} ∪ P
and {η} ∪ P is a c.c. of S, which contradicts the maximality of P again. If case  occurs,
then, for η given in case , instead of yi = t˜i, we choose yi = xki for i = i and yi = a. Hence
ξk ≺S η ≺S ξk+. It is similarly able to get a contradiction. Consequently, Si is a maximal
c.c. of Si for i ∈N .
Zhao et al. Fixed Point Theory and Applications  (2015) 2015:65 Page 6 of 9
From Lemma . it follows that the supremum si and the inﬁmum si of Si exist for
i ∈ N . We next claim that si = maxSi and si = minSi . In fact, if si = maxSi , then si /∈ Si
and Si ⊂ Si ∪ {si } is a c.c. of Si, which contradicts the maximality of Si . Analogously,
we can prove si = minSi . Let ξ := (s , s, . . . , sn) and ξ := (s, s, . . . , sn). It is clear that
ξ, ξ ∈ P . This further implies that ξ = maxP and ξ = minP . In addition, it is easy to
see that, for any x–i ∈ S–i, Pi(si ,x–i) (resp. Pi(si,x–i)) is a maximal element (resp. minimal
element) of Pi(Si,x–i) with respect to the partial order U .
For every ﬁxed i ∈N , we deﬁne a set-valued mapping Ti : S → Si\{∅} by
Ti(x) =
{




: Pi(zi,x–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si,x–i)
}
for all x = (x,x, . . . ,xn) ∈ S. We have revealed si ∈ Ti(x), which illustrates that Ti(x) is
nonempty for every x ∈ S. Apparently, minTi(x) and maxTi(x) exist in [si, si ] for every
x ∈ S, moreover, maxTi(x) = si . Let us deﬁne the set-valued mapping T : S → S\{∅} as
follows: for any x ∈ S
T(x) =
{
y = (y, y, . . . , yn) : yi ∈ Ti(x), i ∈N
}
.
From the deﬁnition of T , it follows that maxT(x) = ξ and minT(x) = (minT(x),
minT(x), . . . ,minTn(x)) for every x ∈ S. This implies that T(S) ⊆ [ξ, ξ] and hence T
satisﬁes the hypothesis (H) of Theorem ..
For any ξk = (xk ,xk, . . . ,xkn) ∈ P , we observe that maxT(ξk) = ξ = (s , s, . . . , sn) and
minT(ξk) = (z′, z′, . . . , z′n) with z′i = minTi(ξk) (i ∈ N ). Let z′ = (z′, z′, . . . , z′n). Then
minT(ξk) = z′. Taking any x′′ ∈ S ∩ (ξk] and z′′i ∈ Ti(x′′) for i ∈ N , we have z′′i i si =
maxTi(ξk), i.e., maxTi(ξk) is an upper bound of Ti(x′′). The arbitrariness of x′′ induces
that maxTi(ξk) is also an upper bound of Ti[S ∩ (ξk]] and the arbitrariness of i ∈ N in-
duces that maxT(ξk) is an upper bound of T[S ∩ (ξk]]. Similarly, taking any y′′ ∈ S ∩ [ξk),
by the condition (II), we get Pi(z′i,xk–i) U Pi(z′i, y′′–i) U Pi(z′′i , y′′–i), which implies that
minTi(ξk) = z′i i z′′i . Hence minTi(ξk) is a lower bound of Ti(y′′). The arbitrariness of
y′′ guarantees that minTi(ξk) is a lower bound of Ti[S∩ [ξk)] and the arbitrariness of i ∈N
reduces that minT(ξk) is a lower bound of T[S∩ [ξk)] oncemore. Consequently, T satisﬁes
(H) of Theorem ..
Note that {maxT(ξk) : ξk ∈P} = {ξ}, Obviously, it is a strongly inversely inductive sub-
set of S. Since Si is a strongly inductive poset, Lemma . induces that S is also a strongly
inductive poset. In the light of Lemma ., the set {minT(ξk) : ξk ∈ P} ⊆ S is a strongly
inductive subset of S. Therefore, T satisﬁes (H) of Theorem .. As a conclusion of The-
orem ., T has the greatest ﬁxed point x∗ and the smallest ﬁxed point x∗ in P .
Suppose that x˜ is a ﬁxed point of T , that is, x˜i ∈ Ti(x˜), which yields, for every ﬁxed i ∈N ,
Pi(x˜i, x˜–i) is a maximal element of Pi(Si, x˜–i). It is equivalent to
Pi(x˜i, x˜–i)⊀U Pi(ti, x˜–i), ∀ti ∈ Si
for every i ∈ N , which indicates that x˜ = (x˜, x˜, . . . , x˜n) is an extended Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, from Lemma ., we see that x∗ is a maximal extended Nash equilibrium and
x∗ is a minimal extended Nash equilibrium of this game. This completes the proof of the
theorem. 
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Corollary . Under the condition (II) of Theorem ., if every player’s strategy set (Si,i)
is a strongly inductive poset for i ∈N and his payoﬀ function Pi furthermore satisﬁes
(III) for any ﬁxed i ∈N and x–i ∈ S–i, Pi(Si,x–i) is an inversely inductive poset in (U ,U ),
then the game  has an extended Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,  has minimal and
maximal extended Nash equilibriums.
Proof In order to check that all conditions of Theorem . are satisﬁed, it suﬃces to check
that Si is inversely inductive for each i ∈N . Let C = {xk}∞k= be an arbitrary c.c. of Si. Then,
for ﬁxed x–i ∈ S–i, by the condition (II) Pi(C,x–i) is also a c.c. of Pi(Si,x–i). By means of
(III), there exists y ∈ Pi(Si,x–i) such that yU Pi(xk ,x–i) for each k = , , . . . .We can choose
x ∈ Si such that y = Pi(x,x–i). Bymeans of the condition (II), we have xi xk for k = , , . . . ,
that is, x is a lower bound of C. Consequently, Si is inversely inductive. Now Theorem .
guarantees the desired results. 
Remark . In addition to (II), all the rest of the hypotheses in Corollary ., respectively,
correspond to the conditions (i) and () in [], Theorem .. However, we not only use the
weaker inductive poset concept but also reduce some tedious hypotheses.
4 Example
The purpose of this section is to show the advantages of our results by the following ex-
ample.
Example . (Militarymanufacture example) Suppose that a war is kindling between two
countries C and C. To strengthen the combat eﬀectiveness, they both intend to invest
funds to acquire more weapons. Suppose that there are two military factories F and F
oﬀering the weapons to the two countries C and C, respectively. As there is shortage of
funds, each country can only invest  million dollars into its military factory. Suppose
that the two factories just produce two weapons of the same type, tankers and ﬁghter
planes. The manufacturing cost of a tanker is  million dollars and a ﬁghter plane will
cost  million dollars. Suppose that the incomes are determined by the number of the
two weapons that the factory can make. An arbitrarily considered outcome is a set of the
total combat eﬀectiveness of a factory. Let U be the collection of all possible outcomes.
Assume that the combat eﬀectiveness of a tanker and a ﬁghter plane is incomparable. It is
obvious that (U ,U ) is a poset.
From what has been described above, we easily get the feasible strategy set of Fi as
Si = {A = (, ),A = (, ),A = (, ),A = (, ),A = (, )}, where the ﬁrst and second
components of Ak with k ∈ {, , . . . , } denote the number of tankers and the number
of ﬁghter planes produced by Fi, respectively. Let Pi : S → U be the payoﬀ function of Fi,
where, for any x ∈ S, Pi(x) denotes the total combat eﬀectiveness of the weapons produced
by Fi. We are now in the position to ﬁnd an extended Nash equilibrium of this NNG.
Proof For any Ak ,At ∈ Si with Ak = (a,a) and At = (b,b), we deﬁne the partial order i
on Si as follows:
Ak i At if and only if ai ≤ bi, for any k, t ∈ {, , . . . , } and i ∈ {, }.
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Obviously, (Si,i) is a poset. Let S = S × S. For any x, y ∈ S with x = (Ak ,At) and y =
(Am,An), k, t,m,n ∈ {, , . . . , }, the partial order S on S is induced by the partial order
i as follows:
xS y if and only if Ak  Am and At  An, for any k, t,m,n ∈ {, , . . . , }.
Then (S,S) is a poset.
It is obvious that the strategy set (Si,i) is a strongly inductive and inversely inductive
poset. Therefore the condition (I) of Theorem . is satisﬁed. For any two strategies x =
(x,x), y = (y, y) ∈ S with xS y, we have xi i yi for each i ∈ {, }, which means that for
each factory, both the number of tankers and the number of ﬁghter planes produced in x
are less than that in y. Hence, the total combat eﬀectiveness of the weapons in x is weaker
than that in y for each factory, that is, Pi(x) U Pi(y) for i ∈ {, }. Then the suﬃciency of
(II) in Theorem . is satisﬁed. We now show that the game also meets the necessity of
(II). For any given Pi(x),Pi(y) ∈ U with Pi(x) U Pi(y), i ∈ {, }, we are in the position to
prove that x S y. If x and y are incomparable, then the numbers of tankers and ﬁghter
planes in x will not simultaneously be less or more than that in y. This implies that neither
Pi(x) U Pi(y) nor Pi(y) U Pi(x) since the combat eﬀectiveness of a tanker and a ﬁghter
plane is incomparable. Therefore, x and y are comparable by hypothesis Pi(x) U Pi(y),
that is, x S y or y S x. By the suﬃciency of (II), if y S x, then Pi(y) U Pi(x), which is a
contradiction. Consequently, xS y. By virtue of Theorem ., the game has maximal and
minimal extended Nash equilibriums. In fact, it easily checks that the strategy (A,A) ∈
S is not only a maximal extended Nash equilibrium but also a minimal extended Nash
equilibrium of this game. 
Remark . It is easy to see that (Si,i) in Example . has neither a sup-center nor an
inf-center, which indicates that Theorem . of [] cannot solve the problem above. Hence
our theorem compares favorably with that of [] in its particular way.
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